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SHRINK MISSOURI, CAMPAIGN FINANCE, 
AND "THE THING THAT WOULDN'T 
LEAVE" 
Richard L. Has en* 
During one of the first seasons of Saturday Night Live, per-
haps in 1976, the "Not Ready for Prime Time Players" satirized 
trailers for horror movies. Along with "The Island of Lost Lug-
gage," the skit featured a trailer for "The Thing That Wouldn't 
Leave." John Belushi played a party guest who planted himself 
on the living room couch after all the other guests had left. 
When Belushi, shoving his face full of potato chips, announced 
that he was going to make a long distance phone call, party host-
ess Jane Curtin gave a blood-curdling scream. 
The year 1976 was also when the United States Supreme 
Court decided Buckley v. Valeo, 1 which, among other things, up-
held limits on campaign contributions but struck down limits on 
campaign expenditures. The per curiam opinion was drafted 
hastily to be in time for the 1976 elections and featured addi-
tional separate opinions from five of the eight Justices who par-
ticipated.2 Members of the Court have since criticized various 
aspects of the opinion, including its decision to judge campaign 
contribution limits by a different standard than campaign expen-
diture limits.3 Yet despite such criticism, nearly 25 years later 
* Professor and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School. B.A., 1986, Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley; M.A., 1988, J.D., 1991, Ph.D. (Political Science), 1992, 
University of California, Los Angeles. Thanks to Richard Briffault, David Burcham, Hal 
Krent, Chris May, Roy Schotland, and Adam Winkler for useful comments and sugges-
tions. I presented an earlier version of this Article at the Annual Meeting of the Ameri-
can Political Science Association held in Washington D.C., August 31-Septembcr 4, 2000. 
Thanks to participants there, especially commentators Michael Fitts and Michael Mal bin, 
for sharing their thoughts. 
I. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
2. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Rehnquist 
wrote separate opinions. Justice Stevens did not participate in the case. 
3. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm 'n v. National Conservmive Political Action 
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 518-19 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Austin v. Michigan Stale 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,678 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring). Chief Justice 
Burger made the same point in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Buckley itself. 
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and many years after the death of John Belushi, Buckley truly 
has become "The Thing That Wouldn't Leave." Buckley has 
appeared to be an immovable object, despite numerous chal-
lenges from many directions. 4 
Perhaps change is finally coming. This past term, the Su-
preme Court decided Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC.5 
Shrink Missouri upheld against First Amendment challenge a 
Missouri law limiting individual campaign contributions to 
statewide candidates to $1,075. The outcome of the case is un-
remarkable following Buckley's decision to uphold the federal 
contribution limit of $1,000, but the reasoning in Shrink Missouri 
is quite significant. In four separate ways, the Court in Shrink 
Missouri lowered the constitutional bar for laws limiting cam-
paign contributions. The Court: (1) ratcheted down the level of 
scrutiny applicable to contribution limit challenges; (2) expanded 
the definition of "corruption" and "the appearance of corrup-
tion" necessary to sustain contribution limits; (3) lowered the 
evidentiary burden for a government defending contribution 
limits; and ( 4) created a very difficult test for those challenging a 
contribution limit amount as unconstitutionally low. In combi-
nation, the opinion shows dramatic new deference toward con-
tribution limits. 
A key question remaining open after Shrink Missouri is the 
extent to which this deference signals a broader willingness of 
the Court to allow regulation of campaign finance. The case 
may be read in two ways. One reading, supported by the Court's 
careful limiting language, is that Buckley is alive and well. Un-
der this reading, Shrink Missouri is simply the Court's latest 
pronouncement that, following Buckley, contribution limits gen-
erally are constitutional. Shrink Missouri then pairs well with 
the second most recent Supreme Court campaign finance case, 
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal 
Election Commission.6 In Colorado Republican, the Supreme 
Court, following Buckley, affirmed a political party's right to 
424 U.S. at 241 ("'For me contributions and expenditures arc two sides of the same First 
Amendment coin''). 
4. Sec Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance, The Parties, and the Court: A Com-
mellt on Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Com-
mission, 14 Const. Comm. 91, 125-26 (1997) (suggesting that Buckley will remain viable 
precedent despite sustained challenge). 
5. 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000). 
6. 518 U.S. 604 (1996). For a comprehensive and thoughtful commentary on the 
case, see Briffault, 14 Const. Comm. at 120-26 (cited in note 4). 
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make unlimited independent expenditures for or against a par-
ticular candidate. 
The second reading of the case is that the Court is preparing 
to erect in place of Buckley a jurisprudence more hospitable to 
campaign finance regulation. The majority opinion never says 
this explicitly, but the message comes through implicitly in the 
Court's discussion and is supported explicitly by the concurring 
opinions. 
We probably will not learn whether the first or second in-
terpretation of Shrink Missouri is correct until Supreme Court 
personnel changes. Nonetheless, even if the Court opts for the 
first reading in the near term, each day the Buckley status quo 
grows increasingly untenable given the explosive growth in the 
campaign finance loopholes of "issue advocacy" and "soft 
money," a point Justice Kennedy raised in his Shrink Missouri 
dissent. 7 Loopholes have eviscerated much of Buckley's force, a 
fact the entire Court should recognize eventually. At the same 
time, reformers continue to push Buckley-challenging campaign 
finance proposals through state and local legislative bodies and, 
more often, through the initiative process. These trends should 
move the Court either to adopt the second interpretation of 
Shrink Missouri or to move in the far opposite direction as urged 
by Justice Thomas,8 barring any contribution or expenditure 
limit, but perhaps upholding campaign finance disclosure laws. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets forth the back-
ground of the Shrink Missouri case in light of Buckley and other 
precedent. Part II explains how the majority of the Shrink Mis-
souri Court significantly lowered the bar for constitutional scru-
tiny of campaign contribution limits and briefly recounts the 
other opinions of the Justices in the case. Part III sets forth and 
assesses the competing interpretations of Shrink Missouri's lar-
ger significance. It argues that current campaign finance reality 
has overtaken Buckley's assumptions, suggesting that one way or 
another, Buckley is likely to leave America's living room in the 
not-too-distant future. 
7. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at '114 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
8. Id. at '116-27 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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I. BUCKLEY, THE LOW CONTRIBUTION LIMIT CASES, 
AND THE BACKGROUND OF SHRINK MISSOURI 
In brief,9 Buckley upheld various contribution limits con-
tained in the 1974 Amendments to the Federal Elections Cam-
paign Act ("FECA"), including a $1,000 limit on individual con-
tributions to federal candidates. 10 It also struck down 
expenditure limits, including a $1,000 limit on independent ex-
penditures relative to a clearly identified candidate.1 
Although recognizing that any law regulating campaign fi-
nancing was subject to the "exacting scrutiny required by the 
First Amendment," 12 the Court mandated divergent treatment 
of contributions and expenditures for two reasons. First, the 
Court held that campaign expenditures were core political 
speech, but a limit on the amount of campaign contributions 
only marginally restricted a contributor's ability to send a mes-
sage of support for a candidate. 13 Thus, expenditures were enti-
tled to greater constitutional protection than contributions. Sec-
ond, the Buckley Court recognized only the interests in 
prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption as 
justifying infringement on First Amendment rights. 14 The Court 
held that large contributions raise the problem of corruption 
"[ t ]o the extent that large contributions are given to secure a po-
litical quid pro quo from current and potential officehold-
ers .... "15 But truly independent expenditures do not raise the 
same danger of corruption because a quid pro quo is more diffi-
cult if politician and spender cannot communicate about the ex-
penditure.16 Finally, the Court rejected a proposed equality ra-
tionale for limiting expenditures, finding the idea "wholly 
9. This part provides only brief background on those parts of Buckley necessary to 
put the Shrink Missouri issues in perspective; it is not meant to be a complete treatment. 
For more comprehensive analysis of current campaign finance law, see Daniel Hays 
Lowenstein, Election Law- Cases and Materials 509-797 (Carolina Academic Press, 
1995), and Daniel H. Lowenstein and Richard L. Hasen. Election Law-2000-2001 Sup-
plement 76-147 (Carolina Academic Press, 2000). 
10. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35. 
II. !d. at 39-51. 
12. !d. at 16. 
13. !d. at 21. 
\4. Sec Federal Election Comm 'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 
470 U.S. 480, 496-497 (1985) ("[P]reventing corruption or the appearance of corruption 
are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for re-
stricting campaign finances.") 
15. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27. 
16. Id. at 46-47. The Court also remarked that expenditure limits could be circum-
vented easily, meaning that such limits would serve "no substantial societal interest." !d. 
at 45. 
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foreign to the First Amendment." 17 Although various members 
of the Court since have questioned the distinction between con-
tributions and expenditures,18 the Court has never disavowed the 
distinction. 
Significantly for purposes here, the Court in Buckley con-
sidered and rejected a challenge to the specific amount of the 
contribution limits. The plaintiffs argued the amounts set were 
not narrowly tailored to prevent corruption or its appearance. 
In response, the Court approvingly quoted the lower court opin-
ion, which stated that "a court has no scalpel to probe, whether, 
say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000." 19 The Su-
preme Court continued that "[s]uch distinctions in degree be-
come significant only when they can be said to amount to differ-
ences in kind."20 The Court also explained that the question was 
whether the limits were so low as to prevent "candidates and po-
litical committees from amassing the resources necessary for ef-
fective advocacy. "21 
Following Buckley, especially in the 1990s, states and local 
jurisdictions adopted campaign finance laws containing contribu-
tion limits at or below $1,000. Challengers to these laws argued 
that the contribution limits were so low compared to the value of 
$1,000 in 1976 dollars as to be a "difference in kind" from the 
Buckley limits because the limits prevented candidates from 
amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy. 22 
Until Shrink Missouri, these challenges typically23 met with 
success in the lower courts. Courts struck down contribution 
limits in Arkansas,24 California/5 Minnesota,26 Missouri,27 and 
17. !d. at 48-49. 
18. Sec supra note 3. 
19. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30. 
20. ld. 
21. ld. at 21. 
22. See, e.g., Nalional Black Police Ass'n v. Dis£ric£ of Columbia Bd. of Elec£ions 
and ££hies, 924 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1996), vacated as moot, 108 F.3d 346 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). 
23. But sec Kemucky Righi 10 Life. Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 648 (6th Cir. 1997), 
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 860 (1997) (holding that a "$1,000 limitation on direct contribu-
tions in connection with local and state elections in Kentucky is not different in kind 
from the $1,000 limitation on direct contributions in connection with federal elections 
upheld in Buckley."). 
24. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998), ccrt. denied, 525 U.S. 1001 
(1998), and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1145 (1999). 
25. California Prolife Council Polilica/ Ac1ion Comm. v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282, 
1297 (E.D. Cal. 1998). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a prelimi-
nary injunction on this issue but failed to reach the merits. 164 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1999) 
The litigation remains pending. 
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Washington D.C. 28 on grounds they were unconstitutionally low. 
Before the Court decided Shrink Missouri, I speculated that the 
$1,000 FECA limit itself could be subject to challenge because 
the limit was not indexed to inflation and was therefore worth 
only a fraction of $1,000 in 1976 dollars.29 
Shrink Missouri started off as a typical low contribution lim-
its case. In 1994, the Missouri legislature enacted campaign con-
tribution limits ranging from $250 for local races to $1,000 for 
statewide races, with the amounts indexed to inflation.30 Before 
the limits became effective, voters approved an initiative estab-
lishing even lower limits that overrode the legislatively set limits. 
The Eijihth Circuit struck down the initiative limits in Carver v. 
Nixon, ruling that the "limits amount to a difference in kind 
from the limits in Buckler "32 Carver effectively revived the leg-
islatively-enacted limits,3 which then faced challenge in Shrink 
Missouri. 
A political action committee, Shrink Missouri Government 
PAC, and Zev David Fredman, a candidate for the 1998 Repub-
lican nomination for state auditor, challenged the contribution 
limits in the state law. The PAC gave Fredman $1,025, the 
maximum allowed by law as adjusted for inflation. "Shrink Mis-
souri represented that, without the limitation, it would contrib-
ute more to the Fredman campaign. Fredman alleged he could 
campaign effectively only with more generous contributions than 
[the law] allowed. "34 
Although the district court held that the contribution limit 
was not unconstitutionally low under Buckley,35 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The 
outcome itself was hardly a surprise given that the Eighth Circuit 
had struck down other Missouri contribution limits in Carver as 
26. Dav .-.Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994), ccrt. denied, 513 U.S. 1127 (1995). 
27. Ca;~·er v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). 
28. National Black Police Ass'n v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections and Ethics, 
924 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1996), vacated as moot, 108 F.3d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
29. Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Just Gets Messier, Nat'! L.J. A21 (Nov. 2, 
1998). 
30. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897,901-02 (2000). 
31. 72 F.3d at 645. 
32. !d. at 644. 
33. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 901. 
34. !d. at 902 (citation omitted). 
35. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734,740 (E.D. Mo. 1998) 
('"The Court finds that the effect of inflation since Buckley was decided has not created a 
'difference in kind' between a $1,000 contribution in 1976, and a $1,075 contribution in 
1998."). 
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well as contribution limits in Minnesota36 and Arkansas. 37 The 
court's reasoning, however, was surprising. 
Only one judge on the three-judge ~anel believed that the 
$1,075 limit was unconstitutionally low. 8 But that judge was 
joined by a second judge39 in holding the contribution law un-
constitutional because the state failed to provide "some demon-
strable evidence that there were genuine problems that resulted 
from contributions in amounts greater than the limits in place."40 
The majority rejected as "conclusory and self-serving" the affi-
davit of a Missouri legislator "that he and his colleagues believed 
there was the 'real potential to buy votes' if the limits were not 
enacted, and that contributions greater than the limits 'have the 
appearance of buying votes. "'41 The Court distinguished the evi-
dence of corruption and its appearance that the Supreme Court 
held sufficient to justify the contribution limits in Buckley, 
namely "the perfidy that had been uncovered in federal cam-
paign financing in 1972. "42 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and by a 6-3 vote, 
reversed. 
II. LOWERING THE BAR IN CONTRIBUTION LIMIT 
CASES 
A. THE MAJORITY LOWERS THE BAR 
Justice Souter, writing for himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, O'Connor and Stevens, upheld 
the Missouri contribution law. The Court held that the state 
provided enough proof of corruption or the appearance of cor-
ruption to justify Missouri's contribution limits, and that the 
amount of the contribution limits was not unconstitutionally 
low.43 Justices Stevens and Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
36. Day v. Holahan, 34 F3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994), ccrt. denied, 513 U.S. 1127 (1995). 
37. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998), ccrt. denied, 525 U.S. 1001 
(1998), and ccrt. denied, 525 U.S. 1145 (1998). 
38. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519,520 (8th Cir. 1998). 
39. Sec also id. at 523 (concurring opinion JOining in reversal of JUdgment but fail-
ing to join in that part of opinion .. finding that the contribution limits arc difkrcnt in 
kind from those approved in Buckley~·. Valeo ... ) (citation omitted); id. at 524 (dissenting 
opinion). 
40. !d. at 521. 
41. Id. at 522. 
42. ld. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 n.2R). 
43. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gm·'t PAC, 120 S. Ct. R97, 910 (2000). 
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each wrote concurring opinions. Justice Kennedy, and Justice 
Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, each dissented. 
Although the majority characterized its opinion as a routine 
application of Buckley,44 the opinion in fact lowered the consti-
tutional bar in contribution limit cases in four different ways. 
Although one can read any of the four changes in isolation as ei-
ther consistent with Buckley or merely small extensions of it, to-
gether they mark a significant departure in the direction of the 
Court's willingness to tolerate campaign contribution laws. I list 
these four changes in the order in which they appear in the Su-
preme Court opinion, not in order of importance. In fact, I be-
lieve the third and fourth changes listed are more significant 
than the first and second changes. 
(1) Ratcheting down the level of scrutiny. As noted above, 
the Court in Buckley held that all campaign finance laws are sub-
ject to "exacting scrutiny" because of First Amendment con-
cerns, but contribution limits were subject to somewhat less scru-
tiny than expenditure limits. Given the lack of clarity, some 
lower courts had construed Buckley to mandate strict scrutiny 
even for review of contribution limits.45 
The majority opinion in Shrink Missouri reexamined the 
level of scrutiny to which contribution laws should be subject 
and held the level to be low indeed. The Court began by noting 
that "[p]recision about the relative rigor of the standard to re-
view contribution limits was not a pretense of the Buckley per 
curiam opinion."46 It then cited those portions of Buckley con-
trasting the interests at stake in contribution limit versus expen-
diture limit cases,47 characterizing Buckley as saying, "in effect, 
that limitin~ contributions left communication significantly un-
impaired."4 After citing a few more Supreme Court campaign 
finance cases,49 the Court explained that "[i]t has, in any event, 
been plain ever since Buckley that contribution limits would 
44. !d. ("There is no reason in logic or evidence to doubt the sufficiency of Buckley 
to govern this case in support of the Missouri statute."). 
45. See, e.g., Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 637-38 (8th Cir. 1995). For a pre-Shrink 
Missouri scholarly examination of the level of scrutiny question surrounding contribution 
limits, see Marlene Arnold Nicholson, Political Campaign Expenditure Limitations and 
the Unconstitutional Condition Doctrine, 10 Hastings Canst. L.Q. 601,607-08 (1983). 
46. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 903. 
47. !d. at 903-04. 
48. !d. at 904. 
49. !d. (citing Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 
U.S. 238, 259-60 (1986), and Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal 
Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604,610 (1996)). 
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more readily clear the hurdles before them. "50 The Court con-
cluded that 
under Buckley's standard of scrutiny, a contribution limit in-
volving "significant interference" with associational rights ... 
could survive if the Government demonstrated that contribu-
tion regulation was "closely drawn" to match a "sufficiently 
important interest," ... though the dollar amount of the limit 
need not be "fine tuned." 51 
Justice Thomas in his dissent derided as "sui generis" the 
majority's new "Buckley's standard of scrutiny," "which fails to 
obscure the Court's ad hoc balancing away of First Amendment 
rights. "52 Whether or not one agrees with Justice Thomas that 
the standard the Court always should apply in campaign finance 
cases is strict scrutiny,53 it is difficult to disagree with his conclu-
sion that "the Court proceeds to apply something less-much 
less- than strict scrutiny. "54 
The standard set by the Court differs in two ways from strict 
scrutiny. First, the justification need only be "sufficiently impor-
tant." Under this language courts could perhaps begin to accept 
new and "non-compelling" interests (beyond the prevention of 
corruption ~nd the appearance of corruption) to justify contribu-
tion limits.5) Second, there need be no close relationship be-
tween the ends of the campaign finance law and the means. The 
Court's explanation that "fine tuning" of contribution limits is 
unnecessary is at odds with the idea of narrow tailoring as re-
quired by strict scrutiny. In sum, the words "exacting scrutiny" 
used in Buckley may have suggested something like strict scru-
tiny, but the standard as explained in Shrink Missouri is consid-
erably more deferential to government interests. 
(2) Expanding the Definitions of "Corruption" and "the Ap-
pearance of Corruption." In Buckley, the Court recognized the 
prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption as a 
constitutionally sufficient justification for contribution limits. 56 
The Buckley Court spoke of the "integrity of our system of rep-
50. !d. 
51. !d. (citation and internal alterations omitted). 
52. !d. at 922 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
53. !d. at 916 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
54. !d. at 922 (Thomas. J., dissenting). 
55. That will not be necessary, however, given how the Court has expanded the 
definitions of corruption and the appearance of corruption and !owned the evidentiary 
burden, as I explain below. 
56. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-26. 
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resentative democracy [being] undermined" "[t]o the extent that 
large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo 
from current and potential office holders. "57 The Court contin-
ued, "Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro 
quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption 
stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse 
inherent in a regime of large financial contributions."58 
The idea that corruption is equivalent to the quid pro quo, 
or as the Court put it in a later case-"dollars for political fa-
vors"59 -seemed well enshrined in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence. In 1990, however, the Court in Austin v. Michigan State 
Chamber of Commerce60 appeared to expand the definition of 
corruption to include an equality-like61 rationale. 62 There, the 
Court upheld a limit on corporate expenditures in a candidate 
campaign on grounds the law "aims at a different type of corrup-
tion in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of 
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the 
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation 
to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas. "63 
Since Austin, the Court had not relied upon or even dis-
cussed this "New Corruption,"64 and some commt?ntators have 
speculated that Austin might be an "aberration"6' or merely a 
''corporations case,"66 not generally applicable to campaign fi-
nance cases. The Court did not mention Austin in the Shrink 
Missouri case either, but the majority opinion did seem to ex-
pand further both the definition of "corruption" and the "ap-
pearance of corruption." 
57. !d. at 26. 
58. !d. at 27. 
59. Federal Elec1ion Comm 'n v. Nalional Conservmive Poli1ical ACiion Commiuee, 
470 U.S. 480,497 (1985). 
60. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
61. I explain why Auslin provides an equality-like rationale in Richard L. Hasen, 
Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalilarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign 
Finance Vouchers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. I, 40-42 (1996). But sec Adam Winkler, Beyond Bel-
lotti, 32 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 133, 136 (1998) (arguing that the Court's concern about 
"other people's money" drives its decision in Auslin). 
62. Sec Lowenstein, Eleclion Law-Cases and Mmerials at 625 (cited in note 9) 
(suggesting the Court first strayed from its definition of corruption in the Massachuseus 
Cillzens for L1je case). 
63. Auslin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
64. The term is Justice Scalia's in his Auslin dissent. !d. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). 
65. Daniel Havs Lowenstein, A Pauemless Mosaic: Campaign Finance and 1he Firsl 
Amendmenl Afler Austin, 21 Cap. U. L. Rev. 381,383 (1992). 
66. Briffault. 14 Const. Comm. at 125 (cited in note 4). 
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Regarding corruption, the Court wrote, "In speaking [in 
Buckley] of 'improper influence' and 'opportunities for abuse' in 
addition to 'quid pro quo arrangements,' we recognized a con-
cern not confined to bribery of public officials, but extending to 
the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes 
of large contributors. "6 As for appearance of corruption, the 
Court remarked, "Leave the perception of impropriety unan-
swered, and the cynical assumption that large donors call the 
tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in 
democratic governance. "68 
The Court did not define further what it meant for politi-
cians to be "too compliant with the wishes of large contributors" 
or for large contributors to be (or simply appear to be but not 
really be) "call[ing] the tune" absent a quid pro quo. Perhaps 
the Court meant that politicians and large contributors would 
make deals with "winks and nods"69 rather than through an ex-
plicit quid pro quo, and campaign contribution limits work to 
prevent this equivalent to bribery. More likely, the Court was 
expressing the view that large campaign contributions buy access 
to elected officials (or at least appear to do so), something objec-
tionable in its own right (or at least objectionable to voters) even 
if there is no quid pro quo or "political favor" given in return for 
the money. 
In any case, Shrink Missouri now stands for the proposition 
that a law limiting campaign contributions is justified if it pre-
vents politicians from being "too compliant with the wishes of 
contributors" or if it prevents voters from believing politicians to 
be too compliant even if this fact is untrue. 
(3) Lowering the Evidentiary Burden. The expantion of the 
definition of corruption would not be that significant if the Court 
required hard proof that politicians are "too compliant with the 
wishes of contributors" and that large contributors "call the 
tune,'' or that voters believed they call the tune and that this be-
lief undermined democratic legitimacy. Proof of corruption 
would be hard to come by in most cases because such informa-
tion likely would be hidden, given the potential political and le-
gal ramifications. The Eighth Circuit took the position that con-
tribution limit laws could not be sustained absent "some 
67. Nixon~·. Shrink Missouri Gov'r PAC, !20 S. Ct. X97, 905 (2000). 
68. !d. at 906. 
69. Cf. Evans v. Unired Srares, 504 U.S. 255, 273 (I 992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
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demonstrable evidence" of either corruption or of the erosion of 
public confidence in the democratic system caused by the ap-
pearance of corruption. 70 
The Eighth Circuit's position was not out in left field. The 
Court has demanded such evidence in other First Amendment 
cases,
71 
and indeed demanded such evidence in Colorado Repub-
lican. In that case, the Court held that it would not simply as-
sume, absent evidence, that all ~arty expenditures are coordi-
nated with the party's candidates. 2 
In Shrink Missouri, however, the Court required virtually 
no evidence to support the government's claim that the limits 
prevented corruption and the appearance of corruption. The 
Court began by explaining that the "quantum of empirical evi-
dence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative 
judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility 
of the justification raised. Buckley demonstrates that the dan-
gers of large, corrupt contributions and the suspicion that large 
contributions are corrupt are neither novel nor implausible. "73 
Although the Court insisted that "mere conjecture"74 was 
not enough, it pointed to very little evidence actually supporting 
the claim that the Missouri contribution limits were necessary to 
prevent corruption or its appearance. First, the Court pointed to 
the only evidence on the point put forward by the State, the affi-
davit from the Missouri legislator75 who stated that "large con-
tributions 'have the real potential to buy votes.'" 76 The Court 
further mentioned newspaper accounts, cited in the district court 
opinion, of possible corruption in Missouri politics.77 Finally, the 
Court cited the overwhelming voter approval of the contribution 
limits initiative that the Eighth Circuit had struck down in 
Carver v. Nixon: "[A]lthough majority votes do not, as such, de-
feat First Amendment protections, the statewide vote on [the 
initiative] certainly attested to the perception [of corruption] re-
lied upon here."78 
70. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
71. Sec, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,664 (1994). 
72. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 
U.S. 604, 617-22 (1996). For a critique of this reasoning, see Briffault, 14 Const. Comm. 
at 110-12 (cited in note 4). 
73. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 906. 
74. !d. at 907. 
75. Sec supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
76. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 907. 
77. !d. 
78. Id. at 908. 
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This evidence is pretty flimsy to support even the weakened 
corruption/appearance idea that politicians are "too compliant 
with the wishes of contributors" and the large contributors "call 
the tune" (or that voters believe they call the tune). The affida-
vit of a single legislator of a "potential" for vote buying79 hardly 
seems to be the requisite "quantum of empirical evidence 
needed to meet heightened judicial scrutiny." Nor do newspaper 
accounts that merely "support inferences of impropriety" rather 
than impropriety itself go to show either a real danger of corrup-
tion or mass public perception of corruption. These newspaper 
accounts, at least as described by the Court, did not point to a 
single criminal investigation, much less a criminal conviction, 
coming from alleged campaign finance improprieties: "One re-
port questioned the state treasurer's decision to use a certain 
bank for most of Missouri's banking business after that institu-
tion contributed $20,000 to the treasurer's campaign. Another 
made much of the receipt by a candidate for state auditor of a 
$40,000 contribution from a brewery and one for $20,000 from a 
bank."80 
The overwhelming support for the Missouri campaign fi-
nance initiative cited by the Court as evidence of a widespread 
perception of corruption instead could be evidence of voters' de-
sire to level the electoral playing field, an equality rationale for 
campaign finance reform. Moreover, the Court discussed no 
evidence showing a causal link between even a widespread per-
ception of corruption and any new unwillingness of voters "to 
take part in democratic governance. "81 This is a very different 
attitude than the one the Court has shown in the past in review-
ing this justification as applied to expenditure limits. In those 
cases, the Court time and again rejected for lack of evidence 
claims that campaign finance laws were necessary to preserve 
voters' beliefs in the integrity of the political process. 82 
79. On the power of the "vote buying" metaphor, set: Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buy-
ing, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1323 (2000). 
80. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 907 (citations omitted). To be fair, the Court also 
citt:d to the Eighth Circuit's opinion in the Carver case and described Carver's citation of 
newspaper articles discussing alleged criminal activity involving large campaign contribu-
tions. !d. 
81. !d. at 906. 
82. Sec, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, California, 454 U.S. 
290, 299 (1981) ("the record in this case docs not support the California Supreme Court's 
conclusion that § 602 is needed to preserve voters' confidence in the ballot measure 
process"); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978) ("If appel-
lee's arguments were supported by rt:cord or legislative findings that corporate advocacy 
threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather 
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In the end, the Court accepted the government's claim of 
"prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption" on 
faith, not on evidence, believing that the point was virtually self-
evident.83 Although commentators have characterized Buckley 
itself as setting up a low evidentiary burden for review of cam-
paign contribution limits,84 after Shrink Missouri the burden is 
almost non-existent. 
( 4) Creating a Difficult Test to Challenge the Amount of 
Contribution Limits. Finally, the Shrink Missouri Court ad-
dressed the question of whether the dollar amounts in the Mis-
souri contribution limits law were too low. The Court first noted 
that the district court concluded that the limits did not appear to 
prevent candidates from raising sufficient funds to run their 
campaigns.85 Then, after stating that over 97% of contributors 
to state auditor candidates made contributions of $2,000 or less,86 
the Court held that it mattered little if plaintiff Fredman was ad-
than serving First Amendment interests. these arguments would merit our consideration. 
But there has been no showing that the relative voice of corporations has been over-
whelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts, or that there has 
been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in government.") (citations and foot-
note omitted); sec also Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Ac-
tion Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 499 (1985) (upholding district court's decision to exclude 
evidence the FEC claimed showed actual corruption or the appearance of corruption 
caused by unregulated PAC expenditures, including "evidence of high-level appoint-
ments in the Reagan administration of persons connected with the PACs and newspaper 
articles and polls purportedly showing a public perception of corruption"). 
83. The Court left open the possibility that there might "be need for a more exten-
sive evidentiary documentation if petitioners had made any showing of their own to cast 
doubt on the apparent implications of Buckley's evidence and the record here." Shrink 
Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 908. No doubt, lower court judges hostile to contribution limits 
will seize on this language to distinguish Shrink Missouri. The Tenth Circuit, reviewing 
Colorado Republican on remand after the Supreme Court decided Shrink Missouri, took 
exactly this approach in holding that parties have a right to make unlimited coordinated 
expenditures to candidates. Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. 
Campaign Comm., 213 F.3d 1221, 1233 n.9 (lOth Cir. 2000), ccrt. granted, 121 S. Ct. 296 
(Oct 10, 2000). On the other hand, the First Circuit recently upheld Maine's new public 
financing system, citing as evidence of the appearance of corruption little more than 
press accounts suggesting that "large contributions have occurred in Maine and that 
Maine citizens are concerned about their impact on lawmakers." Daggett v. Commission 
on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 205 F. 3d 445,457 (1st Cir. 2000). 
84. Briffault, 14 Const. Comm. at 103-04 (cited in note 4). 
85. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 908-09. 
86. Id. at 909. But as Justice Thomas pointed out in dissent "the statistic provides 
no assurance that Missouri's law has not reduced the resources supporting political 
speech, since the largest contributors provide a disproportionate amount of funds." 120 
S. Ct. at 925 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also pointed out that total spend-
ing plummeted in both the primary and general elections after Missouri's contribution 
limits went into effect. The number of challengers to incumbents also declined. Id. at 
925 n.lO. The majority upheld the contributions despite these effects, which suggests 
these facts do not demonstrate a "system of suppressed political advocacy." 
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versely affected by the inability to raise larger amounts of money 
from fewer individuals: "[A] showing of one affected individual 
does not point up a system of suppressed political advocacy that 
would be unconstitutional under Buckley."87 The Court thus fo-
cused on political speech in the aggregate, rather than on the in-
dividual rights of any particular candidate, contributor, or voter. 
Perhaps most significantly, the Shrink Missouri Court then 
refined Buckley for determining whether contribution limits are 
so low as to impede the ability of candidates to amass the re-
sources necessary for effective advocacy: "We asked, in other 
words, whether the contribution limitation was so radical in ef-
fect as to render political association ineffective, drive the sound 
of a candidate's voice below the level of notice, and render con-
tributions pointless. "88 
The Court concluded that inflation was mostly irrelevant: 
"the issue ... cannot be truncated to a narrow question about 
the power of the dollar, but must go to the power to mount a 
campaign with all the dollars likely to be forthcoming. "89 
This new test will be exceedingly difficult for challengers to 
meet. How low would a contribution limit have to be before it is 
"pointless?" Even a $100 contribution limit in many cases would 
allow the candidate to raise enough funds to get a message out 
through leaflets, faxes, and e-mails to media outlets. Leafleting, 
faxing, and sending e-mail may not be the most effective ways to 
campaign, but they are not "pointless." Moreover, "political as-
sociation" would not necessarily be "ineffective" even if no 
money could be contributed to political campaigns; people 
would find ways to associate that did not require expenditure of 
campaign funds. 90 The Court appears to be saying that so long 
as an average candidate could run a decent campaign within the 
challenged contribution limits, the amount of the limits meet the 
constitutional standard. Such evidence would counter a claim 
that the contribution limits imposed a "system of suppressed po-
litical advocacy," even if less popular candidates would lack re-
sources to compete effectively. 
87. !d. at 909 (emphasis added). 
88. !d. 
89. !d. 
90. Volunteer time, for example. docs not count as a contribution under the FECA. 
Sec Buckley v. Va/eo, 424 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding limitations on 
volunteers' incidental expenses). 
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B. THE CONCURRING OPINIONS 
Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Gins-
burg, each wrote concurring opinions. Justice Stevens wrote 
briefly to express his view that "[m]oney is property; it is not 
speech." 91 He argued that the "right to use one's own money to 
hire gladiators, or to fund 'speech by proxy,' certainly merits sig-
nificant constitutional protection. These property rights, how-
ever, are not entitled to the same protection as the right to say 
what one pleases."92 
Although Justice Stevens did not indicate in his Shrink Mis-
souri concurrence precisely how far he would go toward allowing 
greater campaign finance regulation, he did so indicate in his dis-
sent in the Colorado Republican case. There, joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, he wrote, "I believe the Government has an important 
interest in leveling the electoral playing field by constraining the 
cost of federal campaigns. "93 
Justice Breyer, in a Shrink Missouri concurring opinion 
joined by Justice Ginsburg, indicated a strong willingness to al-
low greater campaign finance regulation than contemplated by 
Buckley. At bottom, Justice Breyer, like Justice Stevens in 
Colorado Republican, indicated an acceptance of an equality ra-
tionale for campaign finance reform. He faulted the dissent for 
not seeing that "constitutionally protected interests lie on both 
sides of the legal equation."94 
On the one hand, a decision to contribute money to a cam-
paign is a matter of First Amendment concern-not because 
money is speech (it is not); but because it enables speech .... 
On the other hand, restrictions upon the amount any one in-
dividual can contribute to a particular candidate seek to pro-
tect the integrity of the electoral process- the means through 
which a free society democratically translates political speech 
91. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 910 (Stevens, J., concurring). For an early skepti-
cal view of the equivalence of money and speech by a judge who was on the lower court 
panel deciding Buckley, sec J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money 
Speech?, 85 Yale L.J. 1001 (1976). For a recent exploration more sympathetic to the po-
sition that money is speech, sec Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, 
Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 Geo. L.J. 45 (1997). 
92. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 910 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
93. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 
U.S. 604,649 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also expressed deference to 
Congress's judgment in this area, id. at 650, something Justice Breyer echoed in his 
Shrink Missouri concurring opinion. Sec infra note 97. 
94. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 911 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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into concrete governmental action. Moreover, by limiting the 
size of the largest contributions, such restrictions aim to 
democratize the influence that money itself may bring to bear 
on the electoral process. In doing so, they seek to build public 
confidence in that process and broaden the base of a candi-
date's meaningful financial support, encouraging the public 
participation and open discussion that the First Amendment 
itself presupposes. 9 
499 
Perhaps most tellingly, Justice Breyer remarked that the 
statement in Buckley rejecting as "wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment" an equality rationale for campaign finance reform 
"cannot be taken literally. "96 Applying his standard to the facts 
of the Shrink Missouri case, Justice Breyer concluded, "I agree 
that the legislature understands the problem- the threat to elec-
toral integrity, the need for democratization- better than do 
we."97 
C. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS 
Justice Kennedy in his dissent indicated that he too would 
overrule Buckley, but in the other direction-to disallow any 
campaign contribution limits. Justice Kennedy argued that it 
"mocks the First Amendment" that "[i]ssue advocacy, like soft 
money, is unrestricted, while straightforward speech in the form 
of financial contributions paid to a candidate, speech subject to 
full disclosure and prompt evaluation by the public, is not."98 He 
stated his general agreement with Justice Thomas's dissent and 
remarked that the Buckley "halfway-house" should be elimi-
nated. He nonetheless expressly left open "the possibility that 
Congress, or a state legislature, might devise a system in which 
there are some limits on both expenditures and contributions, 
thus permitting officeholders to concentrate their time and ef-
forts on official duties rather than fundraising. "99 Justice Ken-
nedy thus appeared to endorse tentatively, though without cita-
tion, Professor Blasi's argument that candidate time-protection 
is a compelling interest to justify campaign finance reform. 100 
95. Id. at 911 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
96. Id. at 912 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
97. Id. at 913 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
98. Id. at 914 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
99. Id. at 916 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
100. Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Cam-
paign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendmellt After All, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 
1281 (1994 ). 
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Justice Thomas's position in his Shrink Missouri dissent was 
scarcely in doubt, as he had already indicated in his Colorado 
Republican concurrence that he wished to overrule Buckley's 
tolerance of any campaign finance limits. This time, joined by 
Justice Scalia (who had declined to join that portion of Justice 
Thomas's Colorado Republican concurrence calling for Buckley 
to be overruled101 ), Justice Thomas wrote that he "would subject 
campaign contribution limitations to strict scrutiny, under which 
Missouri's contribution limits are patently unconstitutional." 102 
Justice Thomas spent much of his opinion criticizing Buck-
ley's relative tolerance of contribution limits. 103 The remainder 
of his opinion criticized the Shrink Missouri majority for further 
weakening the test for the constitutionality of contribution lim-
its.to4 
III. TWO READINGS OF SHRINK MISSOURI AND THE 
FUTURE OF "THE THING THAT WOULDN'T LEAVE" 
A. INTRODUCfiON 
Part II demonstrated that the Court in Shrink Missouri had 
four choices to make in reading those parts of Buckley dealing 
with campaign contributions. In confronting each of these four 
choices, the Shrink Missouri Court interpreted Buckley to allow 
for greater, rather than lesser, state regulation of campaign con-
tributions. 
Such a result was not foreordained. For example, the Court 
could have said that the paltry evidence presented in the district 
court- the affidavit of the state legislator regarding the "poten-
tial" for vote buying-simply was not enough to show that the 
problem of the quid pro quo really existed or that voters be-
lieved that it did. The message would have been, as it appears to 
be in certain other First Amendment cases, 105 that next time leg-
101. Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist did not join Part II of Justice Tho-
mas's opinion. Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 631. Part II called for Buckley to be 
overruled. 
\02. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 916 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
103. Id. at 917-23. 
104. !d. at 923-27. 
\05. Sec Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. at 632-33. The Court also has 
been inconsistent in its treatment of the evidentiary issue in its recent federalism cases. 
Compare United Scates v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,562 (1995) (suggesting Congress needed 
more evidence of a substantial effect on commerce to justify law under Commerce 
Clause power), with United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (dismissing Congres-
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islators will have a better chance of success if they make the leg-
islative findings necessary to support the law. 
Alternatively, the Court could have seized on the language 
in Buckley regarding "exacting scrutiny" and demanded a 
greater fit between the ends (prevention of corruption and the 
appearance of corruption) and the means (campaign contribu-
tion limits). The Court also could have given more teeth to the 
Buckley language about not preventing candidates and political 
associations from amassing the resources necessary for effective 
advocacy by requiring trial courts to conduct evidentiary hear-
. h . 106 mgs on t e Issue. 
That the Court did not do so is perhaps unsurprising. Even 
if the Shrink Missouri Court had struck down the Missouri limits 
without a wholesale rewriting of Buckley, it thereby would have 
called into question most state and local campaign contribution 
limits and the FECA $1,000 limits as well. 107 The question re-
mains, however, whether the case has greater significance in 
terms of the Court's willingness to tolerate other campaign fi-
nance regulations, especially two other major campaign finance 
issues, expenditure limitations and regulation of so-called "issue 
advocacy." 
Buckley struck down three kinds of expenditure limits: (1) 
restrictions on independent expenditures; (2) restrictions on 
candidate spending of personal wealth; and (3J restrictions on 
the total amount of spending by a candidate. 1 8 Buckley also 
drew a sharp distinction between express advocacy for or against 
a candidate, which could be subject to contribution limits and 
disclosure of expenditures, and issue advocacy. In drawing the 
line, Buckley limited the reach of electoral regulation to only 
"expenditures for communications that expressly advocate the 
sional evidence of a substantial effect of violence against women on commerce as irrele-
vant). Sec also Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. 627, 639-40 (2000) (suggesting Congress must supply evidence to support its ex-
ercise of power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 US 507,525-27 (1997) (same). 
106. For example, the district court in National Black Police Ass'n (discussed above 
in note 22) conducted a trial and made detailed findings on this issue. 924 F. Supp. 270 
(D.D.C. 1996). 
107. Sec Hasen, Nat'! L.J. at A21 (cited in note 29); see supra note 29 and accompa-
nying text. 
108. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 39-51, 5!-54, 54-59 (1976) (per curiam). I focus 
below on the first of these restrictions. For an argument that restrictions on candidate 
spending of personal wealth help prevent the corruption of their opponents, see E. 
Joshua Rosenkranz, Faulty Assumptions in "Faulty Assumptions": A Response to Profes-
sor Smith's Critiques of Campaign Finance Reform, 30 Conn. L. Rev. 867 (1998). 
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election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate," 109 such as 
advertisements saying "vote for," "elect,'' or "defeat" a candi-
date.110 
B. TWO READINGS 
One reading of Shrink Missouri is that it portends no 
change from the Buckley regime (other than loosening the stan-
dards for approval of contribution limits). The Shrink Missouri 
majority opinion went out of its way to argue numerous times 
that its reasoning and analysis is consistent with Buckley. 111 De-
spite urging by the dissenting Justices, the majority refused to 
reconsider Buckley itself because "we are supposed to decide 
this case. Shrink and Fredman did not request that Buckley be 
overruled." 112 It concluded that " [ t ]here is no reason in logic or 
evidence to doubt the sufficiency of Buckley to govern this case 
in support of the Missouri statute." 113 
Under this reading, the Court will not be more hospitable to 
expenditure limitations or relaxed definitions of issue advocacy. 
As for expenditure limitations, Buckley concluded and Colorado 
Republican recently reaffirmed that expenditure limitations are 
constitutionally infirm. 114 Moreover, nothing in Shrink Missouri 
explicitly considered regulation of expenditures or issue advo-
cacy. 
The other reading of Shrink Missouri is that the Court is 
disingenuous in its claims of deep fidelity to Buckley. Had the 
Court faced only one of the four issues and resolved it in a way 
more favorable to regulation, we might chalk it up to coinci-
dence. But the Court faced four choices and resolved each 
choice in a pro-regulation manner. Thus, although the Court 
went out of its way to show congruence with Buckley, it also 
109. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80. 
110. !d. at 44 n.52. The Court in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citi-
zens for Life, 479 U.S. 238,248-50 (1986), appeared to slightly expand the definition of 
express advocacy. For a look at the jurisprudence of issue advocacy regulation in greater 
depth, see Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 
Tex. L. Rev. 1751, 1755-63 (1999). 
Ill. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 901, 905, 906, 909, 910 
(2000). 
112. !d. at 909. 
113. !d. at 910. 
114. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19, 47; Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. 
Federal Electio~ Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 615 (1996). But sec Austin v. Michigan State 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding limitation on corporate expendi-
tures in candidate campaigns). 
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went out of its way to make it easier to sustain contribution lim-
its. It would be far from impossible for a Court majority more 
sympathetic to campaign finance regulation to draw upon parts 
of its Shrink Missouri opinion to allow greater regulation of 
campaign expenditures and issue advocacy. 
Consider, for example, the television advertisements that a 
supporter of George W. Bush, Sam Wyly, ran in a few select 
television markets last March where Bush was competing 
fiercely for the Republican Party's presidential nomination with 
Senator John McCain. The advertisements never expressly 
urged a vote for Bush or a vote against McCain115 although that 
was their clear intent; 116 instead, they criticized McCain's envi-
ronmental record. 117 Wyly spent $2.5 million on these adver-
tisements,118 which were especially controversial before WylX 
voluntarily disclosed that he was the one paying for them.1 9 
These advertisements did not count as contributions to the Bush 
campaign because they were produced independent of the cam-
paign. Furthermore, the advertisements, lacking the magic 
words like "vote for" or "vote against," fell outside the scope of 
the FECA's disclosure provisions for express advocacy. 
Suppose Congress, citing the Wyly advertisements, passed a 
law regulating such advertisements. Congress could redefine 
"express advocacy" or electioneering to include "any broadcast 
from a television or radio broadcast station which refers to a 
clearly identified candidate for Federal office" and is made 
within sixty days of a general election or thirty days of a primary 
election and that is broadcast to the relevant electorate for that 
office. 120 It could then subject independent expenditures to dol-
lar limitations, as the FECA did before that portion of it was 
struck down. 121 A Supreme Court hospitable to such a new law 
115. For a transcript and critique, sec Richard Pcrcz-Pciia, Air of Mystery Clouds 
Shot at McCain, N.Y. Times Al5 (Mar. 3, 2000). 
116. "Mr. Wyly [who paid for the ads] said that ·of course' he hoped the commercials 
would benefit Mr. Bush." Richard W. Stevenson with Richard Pcrez-Peiia Wealthv 
Texan Says He Bought Anti-McCain Ads, NY. Times AI. AIO (Mar. 4, 2000). ' · 
117. Perez-Peiia, Air of Mystery Clouds Shot at McCain at Al5 (cited in note 115). 
118. Stevenson, Wealthy Texan Says He Bought Anti-AfcCain Ads at AI (cited in 
note 116). 
119. Pcrez-Peiia, Air of Mystery Clouds Shot at McCain at AIS (cited in note 115). 
120. This language appeared in an earlier version of the McCain-Feingold campaign 
finance bill. Sec S. 26, 106th Cong. § 201 (I 999), available at 1999 CONG. U.S. S. 26 
Westlaw CONG-BILLTXT database. 
121. Sec Joel M. Gora, Buckley~·. Valeo: A Landmark of Political Freedom, 33 Ak-
ron L. Rev. 7 (1999) (comparing the McCain-Feingold bill and other modern attempts to 
regulate campaign finances with the campaign finance regime in the FECA as the Court 
504 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 17:483 
could say that Buckley's decisions regarding expenditures and 
issue advocacy were made under the pressure of the 1976 elec-
tion, before there had been an opportunity to gather evidence on 
the corruption and the appearance of corruption stemming from 
independent expenditures 122 and before those engaged in 
electioneering routinely evaded the FECA through 
electioneering that did not mention the magic words like "vote 
for" or "vote against." The Court could then say that evidence 
now demonstrates that such expenditures are meant to influence 
the outcome of electoral campaigns. Further, even absent 
evidence of coordination, voters may believe that Wyly will "call 
the tune" for Bush; no proof of a quid pro quo is required under 
Shrink Missouri, only the possibility that Bush might be "too 
compliant" with the interests of his benefactor. 
The Court might not require much evidence from Congress 
if it believed these claims were "neither novel nor implausi-
ble."123 Perhaps it would be enough to point to a New York 
Times profile of Wyly in which the Texas director of consumer 
group Public Citizen recounted how Wyly, who has an interest in 
a company investing in renewable energy, had offered to help 
convince Governor Bush to include a provision in an energy bill 
requiring that certain coal plants reduce their pollution. The di-
rector said "the episode 'is a crystalline example of what donors 
get from Bush for their contributions-an opportunity to make 
their pitch. ,,~ 24 
The Court would not even need to expressly overrule Buck-
ley to uphold this new federal law; instead, it could distinguish 
Buckley on grounds that new evidence is available that was not 
available in Buckley that would justify a law even under Buck-
ley's strict scrutiny-like standard for expenditures. But the prac-
tical effect of such a ruling would be to overrule Buckley in favor 
struck down in Buckley). 
122. Consider the following statement from the Court's opinion in Federal Election 
Comm 'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985): 
It is of course hypothetically possible here [with PAC expenditures), as in the 
case of the independent expenditures forbidden in Buckley, that candtdates may 
take notice of and reward those responsible for PAC expenditures by giving of-
ficial favors to the latter in exchange for the supporting messages. But here, as 
in Buckley, the absence of prearrangement and coordination undermines the 
value of the expenditure to the candidate, and thereby allevtates the danger that 
expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from 
the candidates. On this record, such an exchange of political favors for uncoor-
dinated expenditures remains a hypothetical possibility and nothing more. 
123. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC. 120 S. Ct. 897,906 (2000). 
124. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., with Richard Pcrez-Peiia, Role in Ads Pws Focus on 
Bush Friend, N.Y. Times A16 (Mar. 6, 2000). 
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of greater regulation. Of course, the Court could get there as 
well by accepting equality as_ a compelling interest to justify 
campaign finance regulation.m Three Justices have signed on to 
this view, 126 but there may not be two more votes for this posi-
tion. The former path seems more likely, therefore, if the Court 
is to move in this direction. 
C. WHERE WILL THE COURT Go? 
The two readings present dramatically different pictures of 
where the Court might go with campaign finance regulation. 
The first reading suggests that Buckley remains viable. The sec-
ond reading suggests that "The Thing" will leave some time 
soon. 
In answering the question of which reading, if either, will 
prevail, one can count noses on the Court or look at broader 
trends. As far as counting noses, the answer depends in part on 
changes in Supreme Court personnel. Three Justices (Breyer, 
Ginsburg, and Stevens), all in the Shrink Missouri majority, al-
ready are on record supporting an equality rationale for cam-
paign finance reform that is more hospitable to regulation. 127 
They almost certainly would support the second reading of the 
case. 
Three Justices (Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas), all dissent-
ing in Shrink Missouri, are on record that Buckley should be 
overruled to disallow any limits on campaign finances beyond 
disclosure. These Justices would not accept either reading of 
Shrink Missouri but would instead throw it out along with the 
rest of the Buckley jurisprudence. 128 
That leaves three Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices O'Connor and Souter) whose views on the two readings of 
Shrink Missouri are less clear. Chief Justice Rehnquist's views 
are perhaps the easiest of the three to decipher from past cases. 
He joined in most of the Buckley opinion except for that part of 
Buckley upholding unequal treatment for minor parties and in-
dependent candidates in the presidential public financing re-
gime.129 He also has been a steadfast adherent to Buckley, ex-
125. I have advocated that the Court accept the equality interest as compelling. Sec 
Hasen, 114 Cal. L. Rev. at 42 (cited in note 61). 
126. Sec supra notes 93-97. 
127. See id. 
128. Sec supra notes 911-104. 
129. Buckley v. Va/eo. 424 U.S. 1, 290-94 (1976) (Rchnquist, J., concurring in part 
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cept insofar as he is willing to allow just about any regulation of 
corporate campaign financing. 13° Finally, the Chief Justice 
joined those portions of Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in 
Colorado Republican that would have struck down the FECA's 
party expenditure provision on grounds that there was no proof 
of corruption as required by Buckley. 131 But he declined to join 
that portion of Justice Thomas's opinion calling for Buckley to 
be overruled. 132 Given this evidence, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
probably would advocate the first reading of Shrink Missouri re-
affirming Buckley's distinction between contributions and ex-
penditures and not altering Buckley's position on issue advocacy. 
Justices O'Connor and Souter recently have taken a cau-
tious approach to campaign finance regulation. Both joined in 
Justice Breyer's narrow plurality opinion in Colorado Republi-
can refusing to examine the facial challenge to the FECA's party 
expenditure provision. 133 Both Justices also declined to sign on 
to Justice Breyer's more expansive concurring opinion in Shrink 
Missouri recognizing equality as a worthy reason for campaign 
finance regulation. Back in 1990, however, Justice O'Connor 
joined in Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion in the Austin case, 
arguinfo against the majority's new, broader definition of corrup-
tion.13 This fact suggests that she would stick with Buckley. On 
the other hand, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in the Shrink 
Missouri majority opinion shows that she has changed views 
about how broadly to define corruption, 135 suggesting perhaps 
that she would reconsider other aspects of Buckley as well. 
As the Court stands constituted right now, there may or 
may not be five Justices who would support the second reading 
of Shrink Missouri, and there do not appear to be five Justices to 
and dissenting in part). 
130. See Briffault, 14 Const. Comm. at 125 n.121 (cited in note 4) ("Chief Justice 
Rehnquist has consistently supported the Buckley framework, but has equally consis-
tently made a special exception to permit restrictions on corporations.") 
131. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm 'n, 518 
U.S. 604, 647-48 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
132. !d. at 631. 
133. !d. at 604. 
134. Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 702 (1990) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring). 
135. It appears Justice O'Connor (as well as Justice Scalia) changed views on the 
meaning of corruption at least once before, by concurring in that portion of Massachu-
setts Citizens for Life that was consistent with Austin's broader view of corruption. See 
Lowenstein, Election Law-Cases and Materials at 640 (cited in note 9) (asking "[c]an 
Justice Scalia's and Justice O'Connor's dissenting posture in Austin be reconciled with 
their joining in Part Ill( B) of the Court's opinion in MCFL'?"). 
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overrule Buckley to create a laissez faire campaign finance re-
gime. This stalemate could well be broken in the next few years, 
depending upon which Justices, if any, leave the Court and who 
might replace them. I leave that question to fortunetellers and 
the next presidential election. 
Beyond nose-counting, it is difficult to imagine that the first 
reading of Shrink Missouri is tenable because it is difficult to 
imagine Buckley continuing as stable precedent for the foresee-
able future. Current campaign finance reality has overtaken 
Buckley's assumptions. The explosive 13rowth of soft money136 
and party and non-party issue advocacy 7 has fundamentally al-
tered the nature of (at least federal) campaigns. 
Congress enacted public financing of presidential campaigns 
at least partly to take presidential candidates out of the fundrais-
ing business. 138 But now these candidates spend much of their 
time raising soft money, 139 which may dwarf the amount of pub-
lic financing available to them. 140 Similarly, if current trends con-
tinue, we can expect "issue advocacy" to swamp campaign fi-
nancing subject to the FECA during the current presidential 
election campaign. 
It is not as though a coherent federal campaign finance law 
exists with a few loopholes. The loopholes have overtaken the 
law itself. Regulating hard money but not soft money and ex-
press advocaci, but not issue advocacy may not "mock[ ]the First 
Amendment" 41 as Justice Kennedy claims, but it certainly un-
dermines any arguments that the FECA contribution limits cur-
rently in place serve a valid function. We have a campaign fi-
nance system moving ever closer to a mere illusion of regulation, 
trapping only the unsophisticated contributors or spenders in a 
136. Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Law, 100 Colum. 
L. Rev. 620, 630-31 (2000) (describing explosion of party usc of soft money in the 1990s). 
Soft money is money raised outside the FECA limits nominally for party building activi-
ties but actually supporting the party's candidates for federal office. Jill Abramson, The 
Nation: The Hard Business of Soft Money, N.Y. Times, Week in Review 3 (Mar. 26, 
2000). Soft money is outside the FECA because it is used to pay for things other than 
express advocacy, like issue advocacy. 
137. Briffault, 77 Texas L. Rev.· at 1761-62 (cited in note 110), reports that the De-
mocratic National Committee coordinated $46 million in issue advocacy expenditures 
with the Clinton-Gore '96 campaign. 
138. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1996) (per curiam) (citing S. Rep. No. 93-689, 
pp. 1-10 (1974)). 
139. Abramson, The Nation at 3 (cited in note 136). 
140. Sec Briffault, 77 Texas L. Rev. at 1760-62 (cited in note 110). 
141. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 914 (2000) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
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web of complex regulation. 142 Anyone with half a brain and a 
good lawyer can get around just about all the limits, disclosures, 
and rules to promote the candidates of his choice. 143 
In the meantime, voters through the initiative process con-
tinue to pass campaign finance laws on the state and local level. 
John McCain's campaign finance reform message in his cam-
paign for the Republican Party's presidential nomination has put 
the issue on the table for the other candidates. Voters do not 
like the current system, but little can change while Buckley re-
mains viable precedent. 
In the end, the first reading of Shrink Missouri cannot be 
sustained because the loophole-ridden system is nonsensical and 
voters will continue to clamor for real change. Even assuming 
Congress does not act on the federal level, voters, pushed by the 
reform community, will continue to pass initiatives pushing the 
edges of Buckley on the state and local level. 
The pressures from voters and reformers who will continue 
to challenge Buckley on the one hand, and the loophole-driven 
campaign finance reality that undermines the Court's Buckley 
structure on the other, suggest that something must give. Shrink 
Missouri indicates that the Court is considering greater defer-
ence toward campaign finance regulation. But the position is 
tentative and precarious. A change in just two key Justices could 
bring the opposite result, an end to the constitutionality of any 
campaign finance regulation besides disclosure. The forces of 
change may soon overtake the forces of inertia, but the direction 
of change remains uncertain. 144 
142. For a district court's detailed factual findings demonstrating how the current 
federal campaign finance system allows easy evasion, see Mariani v. United States, 80 F. 
Supp. 2d 352 (M.D. Pa. 1999). For further proceedings. sec Mariani v. Federal Election 
Commission. 212 F.3d 761 (3rd Cir. 2000), ccrt. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3363 (2000). 
143. Sec Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of Comri-
bwions and Expendiwre Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 265 (2000). 
144. We may learn a bit more about how the current Court views campaign regula-
tion this Term. As this Article went to press, the Court granted certiorari in FEC v. 
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign, 2000 WL 1201886 (No. 00-191, Oct. 10, 2000) 
[Colorado Republican II]. The case presents the question whether parties should be ex-
empt from contribution limits when they coordinate their spending with candidates; such 
coordinated spending is treated as a contribution to a candidate. See 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441 a(a)(7)(B)(i). The Colorado Republican Party argues that political parties do not 
pose the same danger of corruption as other individuals and entities do, and therefore it 
is unconstitutional to limit party contributions to candidates. Regardless of how the cur-
rent Court decides Colorado Republican II, the underlying tensions in campaign finance 
doctrine explained in the Article likely will remain to be llcshcd out by the Court in a 
future case that more directly concerns the continuing vitality of Buckley. 
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"The Thing," a.k.a. Buckley, will leave America's living 
room. The remaining question is who will come visit in its place. 
If the next guest will stay for 25 years or more, the Court had 
better get it right this time. 
